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The First is vintage Stanley Fish.1 Anyone who has had, as have I, the 
pleasure of reading Stanley’s books and articles and watching him perform 
at conferences and colloquia will immediately recognize both the style and 
the substance of The First. And in my case, I agree with virtually all of 
Stanley’s substantive points—which is fortunate, given that I am laboring 
under a 1,000-word limit.   
Given my space constraints, I am only going to comment at length on 
Chapter Three—Why Freedom of Speech Is Not an Academic Value. But I 
shall make some very brief remarks about the other chapters.   
The bottom line of Chapter One is that there is no principle that 
undergirds freedom of speech. I, of course, agree, and Stanley quotes from 
my book, Is There a Right of Freedom of Expression?, in reaching the same 
conclusion I reached in the book.2 I immodestly recommend my book to the 
reader who is looking for further support for Stanley’s conclusion.   
In Chapter Two, Stanley argues that hate speech cannot be defined in 
any neutral way, for whether an expression is hateful bigotry or a hard truth 
depends upon one’s inevitably partisan point of view. I wholeheartedly agree, 
but I will add a couple of points in addition to Stanley’s, points I made in my 
two prior articles on hate speech.   
First, in commenting on Jeremy Waldron’s case for banning hate 
speech, I pointed out that hate speech might be deemed objectionable for two 
different reasons.3 It might be thought dangerous because of its potential to 
persuade its audience to engage in violent or discriminatory conduct. Or it 
might be an evil solely because it psychically wounds its targets. If it is 
objectionable because of its persuasive effects, then we already have a 
jurisprudence in place to deal with incitements to lawlessness.4 
 
* This title is not attributable to Bud Abbott, Lou Costello, or Dennis Martinez.   
** Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. 
1 STANLEY FISH, THE FIRST: HOW TO THINK ABOUT HATE SPEECH, RELIGIOUS SPEECH, FAKE 
NEWS, POST-TRUTH, AND DONALD TRUMP (2019). 
2 Id. at 20 (quoting LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? (2005)). 
3 Larry Alexander, Fighting for Words, NAT’L REV., Dec. 17, 2012, at 36. 
4 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). I have written a lot about Brandenburg and 
its ilk, most recently in a symposium on the 100th anniversary of the clear and present danger test. See 
Larry Alexander, Inciting, Requesting, Provoking, or Persuading Others to Commit Crimes: The Legacy 
of Schenck and Abrams in Free Speech Jurisprudence, 72 S.M.U. L. REV. 389 (2019).   
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Second, if hate speech is to be banned because it is psychically 
wounding, a problem immediately becomes apparent. For, as I wrote in my 
other article on hate speech, it is not the words of hate speech that wound but 
the thoughts in the mind of the speaker they reveal.5 That is why, for example, 
the same words would not wound if they were spoken by, say, an actor in a 
movie portraying a Nazi. They would not wound because no one would 
assume that they revealed what the actor actually thought. But given that 
insight, it becomes obvious both that banning hate speech only bans evidence 
of the hateful thoughts that wound but not the thoughts themselves. 
Moreover, as Henry Louis Gates pointed out in an article I cited, hateful 
thoughts can be expressed in ways that are not typically thought of as hate 
speech.6 And as I illustrated, a button worn on one’s lapel on which was 
written “you know what I would call you if use of the N-word were not 
banned” would be as effective as the N-word in revealing hateful thoughts, 
as would a Ku Klux Klan tie clasp or a white hood on the coat rack.7 
I have written quite a bit about the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment, the topic of Chapter Four. I argued in Chapter Eight of Is There 
a Right of Freedom of Expression? that, like freedom of expression, the 
religion clauses have no principled basis, the same conclusion Stanley 
reaches. But I want to comment on one aspect of Chapter Four, the discussion 
of the Masterpiece Cakeshop case and the compelled speech claim of Jack 
Phillips, the baker.8 If the clients wanted a cake with icing that spelled out 
“Celebrate Same-Sex Marriage,” and the law compelled Phillips to comply, 
then there would be no doubt that he would have a valid compelled speech 
claim. My difficulty, which I have written about, is figuring out just what is 
wrong with compelled speech.9 If we are aware of the compulsion, then why 
would we consider the marks and sounds that are being compelled speech at 
all or speech that represents the thoughts of the “speaker”? Why would we 
think Phillips is speaking through his cake icing? Why would Phillips think 
he is, contrary to his religious beliefs, affirming same-sex marriages? If a 
student had to recite lines in a play to get credit in her drama class, would we 
think her “compelled speech” was objectionable?10 
 
5 See Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense, 13 CONST. 
COMMENT. 71, 76–79 (1996).   
6 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20, 1993, at 37. 
7 Alexander, supra note 5, at 77–78. 
8 See generally Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), rev’d sub 
nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).   
9 See Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147, 147 (2006).   
10 I would raise the same questions about the claims, upheld by the Supreme Court, in the 
progenitor compelled speech cases, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943) (compelled Pledge of Allegiance), and Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (New Hampshire 
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I turn to Chapter Three, Why Freedom of Speech Is Not an Academic 
Value, my principal focus, and not merely because Stanley uses something I 
experienced to make one of his points.11 I generally agree with the points 
Stanley makes. Constitutional freedom of speech has no place in the 
classroom or in applying disciplinary standards to faculty scholarship. I 
agree, moreover, with Stanley’s views about university administrators: when 
speaking as representatives of their institutions, they should stick to extolling 
the virtues of their students, faculty, and basketball team and avoid endorsing 
the partisan positions that they may hold and advocate when not speaking in 
their official capacity. I do not want my university to be for sustainability, 
diversity, or social justice; nor, when I donate to its endowment, do I want 
the endowment’s managers to invest or divest for any reason other than to 
maximize the return.   
On the other hand, if the university is private and not governed by 
constitutional provisions, it may, if it wishes, act other than how I believe it 
should. It may adopt an ideology that permeates all its activities. It may be a 
Marxist university, a libertarian university, or a fill-in-an-ideology 
university. It may require that its classes be taught from an ideological 
perspective, that its faculty’s research be conducted from an ideological 
perspective, that only speakers who endorse the ideology be permitted to 
speak on campus, and, indeed, that all faculty and students agree not to 
dispute the ideology when speaking publicly. I would not want to teach at 
such a university, even if its ideology were the same as mine. I would not 
want my children to attend it. I would resist even giving it the dignity of being 
called a university. Nonetheless, if it is a private institution, I see no 
constitutional impediment to its being thoroughly ideological.   
But what if it is a public university and, thus, subject to constitutional 
restrictions? May the University of California, for example, endorse, in 
addition to the academic values Fish and I regard as the University’s raison 
d’etre, say, diversity or sustainability and require faculty and students to do 
so as well?12 Here, we enter one of the murkiest areas of First Amendment 
law, that of government speech. On the one hand, we want the government 
to speak—to tell us what laws it has passed, what policies it has pursued, and 
why those laws and policies are justified. We may even want it to tell us to 
be all we can be and join the army. On the other hand, it seems a short step 
and one of logical entailment from “what we are doing is justified” to “you 
should re-elect us.” But spending, with taxpayers’ money, endorsements of 
incumbents’ campaigns seems quite problematic. What would we think if our 
 
state motto on its license plates). Misattribution seems a farfetched danger. So, too, does coming to believe 
what one is forced to recite.   
11 See FISH, supra note 1, at 88–90.   
12 Fish clearly would oppose it. But it is not clear what he thinks about its constitutionality.   
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third grader came home and reported that her teacher told the class their 
parents should vote Republican and elect Sara Smith as head of the school 
board? 
The line between proper government speech and improperly partisan 
government speech is controversial.13 It may be a classic Sorites puzzle.14 My 
colleague Steve Smith has quipped, as a pertinent analogy, that the 
government may perhaps endorse the proposition that baseball is our national 
pastime, but it should not take a position on which franchise is the best or on 
the designated hitter.15   
It is not even clear whether government speech is a First Amendment 
issue or just a political one. Because freedom of speech supposedly requires 
the government to be viewpoint neutral, government speech arguably violates 
freedom of speech. But the government cannot act at all, much less speak, 
without violating viewpoint neutrality, so requiring viewpoint neutrality of 
the government seems absurd. This is the core dilemma and paradox of 
freedom of speech as well as the other liberal freedoms, such as religion and 
association.16 It is a paradox that Stanley knows well and surfaces again and 
again in The First.   
So, I leave it unresolved whether government speech is a First 
Amendment issue and, thus, whether a partisan public university is 
unconstitutional. And I conclude by strongly recommending this book. There 
are many excellent points Fish makes that I do not have the space to deal with 
at length—though, I must remark that Fish does a wonderful job of skewering 
those campus activists who show up on campuses already knowing 
everything important and much more than those whom they are paying to 
teach them.   
 
 
13 See LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? (2010). 
14 See Dominic Hyde & Diana Raffman, Sorites Paradox, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Mar. 26, 
2018), plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites-paradox.   
15 Steven D. Smith, Why Is Government Speech Problematic? The Unnecessary Problem, The 
Unnoticed Problem, and The Big Problem, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 945, 966 (2010).   
16 See ALEXANDER, supra note 13.   
